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Chain governance, sector policies and economic sustainability 
in cocoa: a comparative analysis of Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, and 
Ecuador 
 
Giel Ton, Geoffrey Hagelaar, Anna Laven, and Sietze Vellema 
 
1. Introduction* 
Sustainability in cocoa has received a lot of attention in the recent years. Various media, 
advocacy groups and alternative trade organizations address the social aspects of 
workers and producers in the cocoa sector. Certification organizations are in the process 
of developing and implementing codes of practice with the purpose to define and audit 
sustainability performance. Several processing and food manufacturing companies are 
involved in reviewing their sourcing strategies and they make efforts to include 
sustainability criteria an element of trading. Public and private partners meet at round 
tables or international conferences to exchange views on how to achieve sustainability in 
the cocoa sector. Enhancing sustainability performance is subject of discussion within the 
intergovernmental International Cocoa Organisation (ICCO), where producing and 
consuming countries meet to identify policies beneficial to the sector and to the numerous 
smallholder producers in particular. Projects financed by the intergovernmental Common 
Fund for Commodities (CFC) increasingly try to combine market-led development and 
poverty alleviation in commodity dependent countries. The Commodity Action Plan of the 
European Commission specifically addresses the poverty problems in commodity 
dependent countries. Even within the World Trade Organisation, governments are 
discussing the particular problematic situation of commodity dependent countries. These 
public and private endeavours set the context for working towards enhanced sustainability 
performance in cocoa. They are, however, confronted with volatile and whimsical economic 
realities in the international commodity markets as well as with, by times, uneven 
distribution of margins throughout the cocoa chain, which may slow or even hinder 
investments in and progress towards sustainability. An important question therefore is what 
kind of policy or strategy is able to shape the right economic conditions for sustainable 
development in the cocoa sector.  
 
The task of the paper is to examine modes of economic governance and policy measures 
that may alter the economic playing field for sustainability and social equality in the cocoa 
sector. The paper will not define or measure sustainability in cocoa. It has a strong focus 
on the economic dimensions of the desired transition process towards sustainability, and, 
in the context of cocoa, emphasises the relevance of predictability and stability in the 
market for poor cocoa producers. The paper adopts a comparative framework to describe 
the evolution of public-private interaction in economic governance in the cocoa sector 
development. The case studies examine the involvement of national governments with 
managing and governing the economic realities in cocoa in two major West-African 
                                                
* In 2005, the intergovernmental International Cocoa Organization (ICCO) designated a Consultative 
Board to work on the World Cocoa Economy, and to foster sustainability of the sector considering the 
three pillars of sustainability: economic, environmental and social sustainability. In 2008, this became 
formalized in a public-private partnership (PPP), named the Working Group on Round Table for 
Sustainable Cocoa (RTSC). The Working Group will consist of governments of producing and consuming 
countries, the European Commission, selected NGOs and trade and industry associations, the ICCO 
Spokespersons for Producers and Consumers and the Chairman of the ICCO Consultative Board on the 
World Cocoa Economy. The present report is geared to the policy advisors involved in these discussions, 
and wants to highlight some dynamic and historic elements related with the governance of the cocoa 
value chain.  
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producing countries, Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, and one Latin American country producing a 
specific quality cocoa, Ecuador. The paper further focuses on the policy instruments used 
to in the governance system in these countries that are related with the economic 
sustainability of the sector. First, the paper introduces the issue of public-private 
interaction in the field of economic governance.  
2. Public and private interaction in cocoa 
In the past three decades, the role of public interventions in the economic realm has been 
modified and scrutinised. Formerly, intergovernmental commodity agreements, such as the 
International Cocoa Agreement, contributed to a certain level of stabilization and rule 
setting in commodity markets and thereby to a more robust business climate for 
producers, traders, and processors. Currently, the scope of the commodity agreements 
moved away from direct interventions in the markets to finding other measures. Direct 
government involvement in supply management and price stabilization has decreased, 
partly due to the choices fundamental to, for example, the structural adjustments policies 
of the World Bank, the lending policies of the International Monetary Fund, and the trade 
policies negotiated in the World Trade Organisation.  
 
More recently, however, the general interest in sustainable development evoked a 
discussion on economic governance for ensuring public goals, such as sustainable 
development or poverty alleviation. Therefore, it seems worthwhile to investigate how 
existing policy frameworks contribute to equity and economic sustainability in cross-border 
and complex commodity chains. In the case of the cocoa commodity chain, the 
intergovernmental commodity agreement exists and specifically addresses sustainability. 
Likewise, in producing countries, national policies and public organisations, such as 
marketing boards, still strongly shape the dynamics in the cocoa chains, and, 
consequently, the conditions for enhancing sustainability. Although this public interference 
with market realities may be more limited in scope than in the 1970s and 1980s, it still 
seems important to discover how these institutions and agreements relate to on-going 
market-led initiatives and how they set conditions for the improvement process towards 
sustainability in cocoa.  
 
In the case of commodity chains, the public sector has a role to play in creating the right 
economic conditions for the desired improvement process due to the involvement of large 
numbers of poor and relatively unorganised smallholder producers. This may be beyond 
the capacity of individual market-led initiatives that works towards sustainability in the 
cocoa sector. In a discussion on sustainability, the International Cocoa Organisation 
proposes “…that the economic pillar takes priority and precedence over the other two 
pillars. The main reason for that is that for the smallholder cocoa farmers, economic 
considerations override both environmental and social concerns. (..) In other words, the 
first priority in activities towards a sustainable world cocoa economy is to improve the 
revenues and incomes of the cocoa farmers” (ICCO, 2007). Hence, it seems likely that the 
growing interest in sustainability has to address the issue of how public policies and 
regulations affect both the economic playing field and the nature of commercial 
transactions in such a way that it sets the conditions for sustainability (Vellema et at, 
2007). 
 
The issue of creating the right conditions for sustainable development in cocoa is 
becoming even more complicated because developments of the global value chain of 
cocoa tend towards concentration of production in a small number of countries and a 
process of vertical integration of upstream activities by a handful of international cocoa 
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processing firms (Daviron and Gibbon, 2002; Losch, 2002; Abbot, Wilcox and Muir 2005). 
This two-fold process of economic concentration affects bargaining power and price 
setting between the different chain actors. These concentration processes also determine, 
together with the taxes and levies applied on various transactions within the chain, the 
farm-gate price and thus the economic perspectives for the producers. Therefore, it is 
important to look into the attributes of a chain configuration that are most intimately 
related with the ‘economic sustainability’ of the sector: the stability of internal price levels 
and the share of the producer price relative as a percentage of the export price.  
 
Price levels in international commodity trade are generally independent of the volume 
increases in production of individual countries, but respond to global stock levels. There is 
a wide fluctuation of prices between years. Figure 1 gives an impression of the steady 
increase in cocoa production and the irregular pattern of world cocoa prices. 
 
Figure 1: World cocoa production and cocoa world prices (1961-2006) 
 
Source: (Gouin 2007) 
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Figure 2:  ICCO - Averages of weekly prices 2002-2008 
 
Source: ICCO, http://www.fao.org/es/esc/prices 
 
For chain actors price levels are a very important incentive to produce, but also the 
predictability of the price during the year is an important issue that influences 
entrepreneurial decision making, by farmers, traders, exporters, and even for government 
financial policy. Cocoa is characterized by a very instable world market price during the 
year, varying between weeks and months without any seasonality. Figure 2 indicates this 
fluctuation of the cocoa price in the (depreciating) US$ and in terms of a (stable) virtual 
international currency, using the IMF Standard Drawings Right (SDR). This price volatility 
increases risks and transaction costs for all chain players. To lower these transaction 
costs for themselves, private business (including smallholder farmers) tries to find ways to 
reduce them. This can be done collectively through chain coordination, but also by using 
the government to define ‘rules of the game’ that lead to more transparent and stable 
domestic prices.  
 
Most cocoa producing countries have developed institutional arrangements to translate the 
international cocoa prices to (indicative) domestic prices for cocoa beans in the place of 
processing or place of shipment to international markets. Some countries have 
mechanisms to fix and stabilize these prices during specific periods, and some countries 
have developed institutional arrangements in the value chain to target specific qualities with 
higher than average prices on the world market. The following case studies illustrate the 
historical process that has lead to country-specific institutional arrangements that are key 
in economic governance of the domestic cocoa sector, and that are the result of the 
economic interests of and power relations between producers, domestic intermediary 
traders, governments and international processing companies  
 
The case studies examine how the interactions between governments, intermediary 
organisations, international authorities and firms shape economic governance in the cocoa 
sector and define margins and price setting in transactions. These case studies label 
several periods in each country’s cocoa sector history according to the dominant ‘mode of 
governance’ during that period and have an interest in the specific socio-political factors 
that influence the functioning and possible transition of modes of governance. To describe 
this economic governance system, the paper uses a conceptual framework in the 
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description of the cocoa case-studies developed by Griffiths and Zammuto (2005). The 
framework directs our attention to the steering of a commodity sector through the 
interaction between public and private actors to coordinate economic activity and decision 
making.  
 
The comparative framework (Figure 3) includes two fairly independent dimensions that 
influence economic governance and decision making defining the conditions within 
economic transactions within a sector: (1) the fragmentation or integration of the value 
chain (McGahan and Porter, 1997).; and (2) the level of state involvement versus 
coordination through market mechanisms (North, 1981; Hall and Soskice, 2001). 
Countries and socially embedded commodity chains are inherently complex and not 
comparatively measurable on a scale: therefore not the absolute position in each country-
specific graph of the institutional governance system, but the direction of change in time of 
this system is important. 
 
 
Figure 3: Comparative framework for labelling public-private interaction in a commodity chain 
Transactions 
coordinated through 
state involvement 
State governance Joint governance 
Market governance Corporate governance 
Transactions 
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market forces 
Value chain 
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Source: Authors, based on (Griffiths and Zammuto 2005) 
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3. Ghana* 
 
In Sum 
Ghana started already before World War II with coordinated action to stabilize 
prices. This was done in direct negotiation between import companies 
(buyers), exporters and organized producers.  This resulted in corporate 
governance systems to govern transaction in the cocoa sector (the ‘cocoa 
buying agreement’), but after the war transactions and price setting was 
increasingly regulated by the state with a decreasing chain integration. The 
recent periods of gradual reform during the 1990s and the current re-
affirmation of the state control in the cocoa chain, make that Ghana is stays in 
the upper level of the graph (high influence of the state in governing 
transactions) and gradually moving tot the right, influenced by the growing 
chain integration within the transnational cocoa processing industries and/or 
certification schemes (fair trade, organic, etc.). In Ghana there is an alliance 
between international buyers and the government, sharing an interest in 
maintaining the current system, as it guarantees a consistent supply of 
premium quality beans (Fold, 2001); a kind of joint governance system with an 
active role of the state and a passive role of global buyers. 
 
Changing Institutional Governance Systems in Ghanaian Cocoa 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Ghana is the world’s second largest producer of cocoa, responsible for producing around 
20 per cent of the world’s cocoa in 2005-06 (ICCO, 2006). Cocoa is a very important 
source of income and foreign exchange earnings for Ghana. Around 6.3 million Ghanaians 
depend on cocoa for their living, representing around 30 per cent of the total population. 
Cocoa is Ghana's dominant cash crop and single most important export product. In 2006, 
exports of cocoa butter, powder, beans, paste, and waste totalled US$1,241 million, 
equivalent to more than 33% of Ghana's merchandise exports. The contribution of cocoa 
                                                
* Research Anna Laven, University of Amsterdam/ Royal Tropical Institute 
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production and marketing to GDP was 8.5% in 2006, up from 4.9% in 1998. The EC is the 
main export destination for cocoa produced in Ghana (IMF 2007).  
 
Cocoa is cultivated on some 1.6 million hectares in Southern and Central Ghana.  About 
three quarters of output is produced by some 700,000 small-scale farms. The product life-
cycle of cocoa (increasing and later decreasing cocoa yield after establishing a plantation) 
and more intensified methods of cocoa cultivation, stimulated by the government and 
private extension providers, have been key factors in boosting cocoa production, leading 
to record outputs in 2003/04 and 2005/06 (Ruf, 2007). Smuggling from Côte d’Ivoire 
(and the end of smuggling from Ghana to neighbouring countries) also contributed to the 
increase in volume of cocoa beans exported.  
 
The Ghanaian government has always been actively involved with the development of the 
cocoa sector. During colonial times, public involvement was initially combined with private 
efforts to stimulate cocoa production and to improve its quality. From the late 1940s 
onward, a system of state governance was put in place, which was consolidated during the 
early years of independence.  
 
With the introduction of structural adjustment programs (SAPs) in the late 1980s, 
governance processes in other cocoa-producing countries shifted from state to forms of 
corporate and joint governance. In Ghana, however, state governance remained the 
dominant system.  The introduction of gradual reforms nevertheless led to other actors 
entering the sector and taking over some of the previous state responsibilities.  
 
A distinction can be made between three time periods. The first period (1920-1980) deals 
with the shifts from a fairly corporate governance system around Worlds War II, as part of 
the colonial economy, to a state-controlled economy after Independence in 1957. The 
second period (1980-2000) describes the gradual introduction of reforms and the 
consolidation of the strong position of the state, domestically as well as internationally. The 
third period (2000-present) discusses the responses of other actors to the system of state 
governance, and its current dynamics. 
 
 
Ghanaian cocoa sector policies in motion 
Period 1 1920-1957 Colonial governance  
As a result of the colonization process, cocoa was introduced to Africa in the late 
nineteenth century. Once established in Ghana, cocoa production expanded rapidly and 
Africa became the main producer by the mid-1920s. Cocoa has dominated the political 
economy of Ghana (formerly Gold Coast) since 1920. Between 1923 and 1932, cocoa 
accounted for an average of around 77 per cent of Ghana’s total exports (Department of 
Cooperatives, 1990, 11). In the cocoa season 1920-21, Ghana became the world’s largest 
producer, reaching its peak with a total production of around 560,000 tons, and it kept 
this leading position for more than 55 years, until in 1977-78 Côte d’Ivoire took over this 
position. In the early years, cocoa production was concentrated in the Eastern region 
(Ministry of Finance, 1999, 6). In the mid 1940s the centre of production shifted to the 
Ashanti and Brong Ahafo regions, where cocoa was produced on virgin forest land. This is 
partly attributed to the outbreak of Cocoa Swollen Shoot Virus disease (CSSVD), which had 
to be ‘cured’ by cutting down the trees. However, the willingness of many small farmers to 
migrate to new cocoa production regions was a sine qua non for the expansion of the 
cocoa sector (COCOBOD, 2000; Hill, 1963). 
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During the colonial period, the cocoa sector initially operated under a free market system. 
European companies controlled both local buying and exporting, with Cadbury as the 
leading British cocoa manufacturer. Public interventions took place through the 
involvement of the (colonial) Department of Agriculture, which encouraged the 
establishment of cooperative enterprise in Ghana’s cocoa industry. Organizing farmers into 
cooperatives was seen as a way to ensure the production of good quality cocoa for 
export. Moreover, by means of combined sales, cooperative members could demand 
higher prices. Around the same time, cocoa societies became involved in the provision of 
credit, farmer inputs (e.g. chemicals) and consumer goods. Many European traders were 
hostile to the promotion of cooperatives with government backing, because they worried 
that this would eventually eliminate them from the cocoa trade (Department of 
Cooperatives, 1990, 9-16).  
 
The strength of the cooperative movement became clear at the time of the first cocoa 
hold-up in 1930-31. The action achieved its goal: both the supply and the price steadily 
increased (Milborn, 1970, 59). In 1937 a second cocoa hold-up was organized in response 
to a fall in the world price of cocoa and the concomitant introduction of the ‘cocoa buying 
agreement’, which introduced the idea of paying a uniform price to all farmers. Farmers 
and brokers, who had not been consulted by the foreign buyers, initially rejected this 
agreement. Both internal and external marketing of cocoa stagnated, until in March 1938 a 
‘truce’ was signed between the two parties and sales restarted, though in a context of 20 
per cent declined world market prices (Milborn, 1970).  
 
In response to the hold-up, a royal assignment called for a ‘commission’ to report on the 
conditions of the cocoa economy in West Africa. The commission’s recommendation was: 
public support for cocoa marketing operations (Graue, 1950, 259). Consequently, the 
West African Cocoa Control Board was established in 1940, and replaced in 1942 by the 
wider West African Produce Control Board (WAPCB). In 1947, the Cocoa Marketing Board 
(COCOBOD) was installed and it was decided that the British Ministry of Food was to be the 
only seller of the Ghanaian cocoa, using the COCOBOD channel. The existing (mainly 
expatriate) cocoa buying companies were appointed agents of the WAPCB and they 
continued to have responsibility for buying (Anin, 2003, 15).  
 
Cadbury’s position was in its support for the argument that West African cocoa economies 
should be rehabilitated and in its ‘general acceptance of the marketing boards’ a reality in 
the Colonial cocoa commodity chain (Beckman 1976, 43).  
Period 2 1957-1980 State-controlled cocoa economy 
In 1953, the United Ghana Farmers Cooperative Council was founded as ‘a general 
farmers’ organization with political objectives’. It became the so-called farmers’ wing of the 
Convention People’s Party (CPP) led by President Nkrumah (Beckman, 1976, 11). The 
Farmers’ Council was given sole responsibility for cooperative development and it became 
the head of the cooperative movement, which in itself became an economic and political 
force to reckon with. In 1961, four years after the country’s independence, the Farmers’ 
Council capitalized on the Colonial heritage of the cocoa marketing boards and took over 
the cocoa trade and became the monopoly buyer of Ghana’s cocoa. Doing so, it put an 
end to the direct involvement of foreign buyers in cocoa marketing. In the same year, the 
Cocoa Marketing Company (CMC) Ghana was set up as a commission agent of COCOBOD. 
CMC Ghana became responsible for registering buyers, appointing local (Ghanaian) buying 
agents to facilitate foreign buyers’ operations in Accra, marketing of cocoa, recording of 
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cocoa sales and shipping of cocoa, including involved payments (Amoah, 1998: 78-104). 
From being governed by fairly liberal economic policies, the cocoa sector was transformed 
into a predominantly state-controlled system, which moreover was now independent from 
colonial ties.  
 
The state also invested in processing capacity, furthering state-led chain integration. In 
1963, two cocoa processing factories were built, both owned by COCOBOD, and falling 
under the mandate of the Ministry of Finance. They were operated by one of COCOBOD’s 
subsidiaries, the Cocoa Processing Company limited (CPC) (Ministry of Finance, 1999, 71-
2). In 1982, COCOBOD took over a third factory, the formerly British processing company 
West African Mills (WAM) at Takoradi.   
 
The state governance continued after a short disruption between 1966 and 1977. When in 
1966 the Nkrumah Government was overthrown by a military coup, the Farmers’ Council 
was dissolved and banned (Beckman, 1976, 11-7). During the following decade, 
characterized by political instability and mismanagement, cocoa prices fell and cocoa 
production was halved. Competition among local buyers was re-introduced, but this did not 
last long due to problems with delayed payments. A single buying system was reintroduced 
and from 1977 onward, the Produce Buying Company (PBC), a subsidiary of COCOBOD, 
was in control of internal marketing. In this period, different subsidiaries of COCOBOD 
provided support and services to the farmers. The Cocoa Services Division (CSD) had the 
monopoly on the procurement and distribution of inputs. In addition to its role as input 
provider, the CSD used to be responsible for cocoa extension services, which consisted of 
advising farmers in cocoa and coffee production, the production and distribution of 
planting materials and the control of pests and diseases (Amezah, 2003, 1). The Quality 
Control Division (QCD) was responsible for a strict control on the quality of cocoa. The 
Cocoa Research Institute Ghana (CRIG) was the national centre of excellence for the study 
and cultivation of cocoa.  
 
By the early 1980s, Ghana's economy and political system was in an advanced state of 
collapse. In 1981, Lieutenant Rawlings came to power and he had to face the complexity 
of the economic crisis. When a severe drought in 1983 worsened the situation, his 
government accepted the intervention of international donor organizations. The Economic 
Recovery Program (ERP) was set up, resulting in the introduction of reforms in the cocoa 
sector through its Cocoa Rehabilitation Project (CRP) and the Agricultural Sector 
Adjustment Programme (ASAP) (Ministry of Finance, 1999; Fold, 2002).  
Period 3 1980-2000 Gradual reform  
The reforms were meant to have the effect of increasing producer prices by reducing the 
costs of inefficient marketing and pricing systems as well as by improving efficiency of 
related cocoa activities (Akiyama, 2001). All major West African cocoa-producing countries 
introduced at least some reforms since the late 1980s. While Cameroon and Nigeria 
initiated drastic reforms, Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana chose a more gradual approach to 
liberalization, thus resisting some of the pressures of international donor organizations. 
 
Wanting to avoid the generally negative experiences of cocoa producing countries that 
liberalized over-night, such as Nigeria, the Ghanaian government opted for a gradual 
introduction of reforms. These have so far included the liberalization of internal marketing, 
privatization of input distribution, reform of extension services, reorganization of 
processing activities and a drastic reduction in COCOBOD’s staff-level. In the early 1980s 
there were approximately 120,000 people employed by COCOBOD while in 2006 this 
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number was only 5,500 (IMF 2007) Many former employers of COCOBOD are still involved 
in the cocoa sector, as private consultants, providers of extension services and/or as 
buyers of cocoa..  
 
COCOBOD continued to control external marketing. The QCD remained responsible for the 
final quality checks of cocoa beans and Ghana continued to deliver consistent supplies of 
relatively good quality cocoa, for which it received a premium on the world market. 
Through a system of forward sales, COCOBOD managed to pre-finance the cocoa while 
price stabilization has remained intact (Ministry of Finance, 1999; Laven, 2007a).  
 
The liberalization of internal marketing started in 1992 with the introduction of private 
Licensed Buying Companies (LBCs) as competitors to the state-owned monopoly in buying 
cocoa from farmers. During 1996-97, sixteen LBCs obtained the permission to buy cocoa 
alongside the PBC, and four received provisional licenses (Ministry of Finance, 1999, 45). 
The number of buyers fluctuated, as did their active involvement in buying cocoa. The 
majority of LBCs were Ghanaian, only two were foreign-owned (Olam and Armajaro). One 
LBC was farmer-owned (Kuapa Kokoo Union) and was set up with the support of 
international NGOs. PBC remained the largest buyer by far.  
 
Not only marketing reforms took place in this period, which was also characterized by 
institutional reforms. COCOBOD reformed the organization of its processing activities, as a 
way of expanding its low processing base. In 1993, this resulted in a joint venture with a 
German processor. COCOBOD moreover merged the extension component of its services 
division with that of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MoFA), providing unified extension 
services. The division’s non-extension functions were organized on the basis of project and 
private sector participation (Ministry of Finance, 1999, 23-4). With these changes, CSD’s 
monopoly on the procurement and distribution of inputs ended. In 1995, the Ghana Cocoa, 
Coffee and Sheanut Farmers Association (GCCSFA) took over this responsibility. The 
objective of this privatization of input supply was to increase competition, which would – so 
it was hoped - lead to the availability of the right quantity of inputs at the right time, and 
moreover effect a reduction in the price paid for the inputs.  
Period 4  2000-present Shifts from within 
In response to the reforms and the reduced role of COCOBOD and its subsidiaries, other 
actors and partnerships entered the cocoa sector, ready to fill the vacuum left by the 
(partly) retreating public sector. PBC is still the major buying company (buying almost 33 
per cent of the cocoa in 2005-06), although its buyers’ share is declining. Recently PBC 
itself was partly privatized and its shares are traded on the stock market, with COCOBOD 
being the company’s major shareholder. In this period, no new foreign buyers have entered 
the stage. One new (still small) farmer-owned LBC, Ghana Sompa Kokoo, was recently set 
up by the Kuapa Kokoo Union.  
 
The introduction of competition in internal marketing did not result in price-differentiation. In 
the absence of competition through prices, LBCs generally found (other) ways to ensure 
that farmers sell (only) to them. They invest in building trust as well as in building social 
capital.  
 
LBCs receive a yearly fixed ‘buyers-margin’ set by the government. In 2002-03 this margin 
was set at 9 per cent of the FoB price; in 2004-05 it got somewhat reduced. From this 
margin LBCs pay their Purchasing Clerks (PCs) on commission basis, thus encouraging 
them to buy as much cocoa as possible from the farmers in their communities. As a result 
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of the gradual pace of the reforms LBCs are locked into a system with few incentives for 
high performance, and little financial scope for establishing strong relations with farmers. 
 
Following liberalization of internal marketing of cocoa, the government decided to allow 
qualified LBCs to export part of their cocoa purchases, with effect from October 2000. 
Officially LBCs were allowed to export 30 per cent of their domestic purchases, as long as 
they meet the conditions set by the Ghanaian Ministry of Finance. The idea behind the 
gradual pace of the reforms was that this transition period would allow LBCs to become 
familiar with and acquire the necessary skills for effective external marketing (Ministry of 
Finance, 1999). In 2007 this partial liberalization has been discontinued (IMF 2007).  
Government officials argue that the current system works and that LBCs are unwilling or 
not yet ready to enter into direct exporting. Some of the larger LBCs contest this view, 
arguing that Cocobod obstructs their involvement in external marketing. LBCs do not 
openly complain about the practices of Cocobod. After all, the relationship between LBCs 
and COCOBOD remains a hierarchical one, as they depend on COCOBOD for their license 
to operate. Also, many of the LBCs, especially the smaller ones, benefit from the current 
system; they can take advantage of the marketing expertise and ability to borrow offshore 
when financing local purchases of the CMC. To global buyers of cocoa the partially 
liberalized system in Ghana is also beneficial. Thanks to the reliability of the marketing 
system, Ghana enjoys a high reputation for contract and quality fulfillment.  
 
Currently, world’s largest cocoa processing companies Cargill, ADM are in the process of 
outsourcing part of their processing facilities to Ghana. Barry Callebaut, world’s third 
largest processing company, already has a processing factory running with a capacity of 
75.000 tons. Although physically international traders did move ‘closer’ to the farmers, 
their grinding operations in Ghana has not resulted in direct contract relations between 
buyers and cocoa farmers International buyers have limited their activities in Ghana to 
initiating/supporting small-scale programs aiming mainly at the use of more 
environmentally friendly practices, addressing the problem of child labor and community 
development, individually or for example through involvement in public-private-civil 
partnerships like the Sustainable Tree Crop Program-STCP. 
 
For the Ghanaian government and COCOBOD there are strategic reasons why the cocoa 
sector is not fully liberalized The Ghana Cocoa Board, COCOBOD, a semi-autonomous 
institution under the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, has still a huge  staff of 
some 5,500 (IMF 2007). Table 1 shows the composition of the net FOB price during the 
2002/2003 season. There is a significant margin between the FOB price (‘free on board’ 
price) and the CIF price of exported cocoa (placed in Europe harbor, incorporating the 
‘costs, insurance and freight’ from West-Africa) equalling around 35 per cent in 2002/03. 
As export is organized by COCOBOD, there might be an significant additional flow of 
resources generated by their state-led export transactions. 
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Table 1: The composition of the Net FoB price in 2002-03 
COMPONENT MAINSTREAM COCOA 
USD/TONNE 1 = 8700 
CEDIS  
DISTRIBUTION IN % NET 
FOB 
Producer price  976 68,11 
Buyers' Margin 128 8,93 
Domestic transport costs 32,2 2,26 
Storage and shipping 18,4 1,27 
Disinfectation costs 9,66 0,67 
Crop finance costs 33,3 2,3 
Government taxes and 
levies 
236 16,44 
FOB price 1433,56 99,98 % 
CIF price (to Europe) ± 2200   
Source: COCOBOD, 2003 (white cells) and personal communication industry (dark cell), 
2003. 
 
It is clear that for the Ghanaian government, cocoa is an important source of income and 
foreign exchange earnings; consequently, the government has a stake in retaining control 
over cocoa exports. Cocoa exports are subject to taxes and repatriation of export revenue 
and its conversion into local currency.  The tax rate on exports of cocoa beans is 
determined annually by the Minster of Finance and Economic Planning; for the crop year 
2007/08, it is 11.1 per cent of the FOB price.  The effective tax rate has varied strongly 
over the recent years (IMF, 2007).  
 
The producer price is adjusted to the real price on the market through a yearly review of 
prices and margins. A bonus is paid for cocoa supplied by farmers through the LBCs. The 
producer bonus is calculated by using the policy defined percentage of the FOB price: 70% 
in 2007. The calculation of the bonus and the distribution of the bonus to the cocoa 
farmers is perhaps the most innovative institutional arrangement to influence price stability 
and fairness within the cocoa chain. The Ministry of Finance states that farmers are 
protected from price falls, and only positive adjustments in the producer price are 
possible. 
'Since producer prices are announced prior to the actual purchase or export of 
cocoa, a situation may arise where ex-post payments could exceed 70% of FOB 
price. This could arise from differences between the ex-ante projected exchange 
rates and world market prices and the actual ones. In such a situation, the over-
payment to the farmer should be borne by other stakeholders, other than the 
farmer. However, in a situation where exchange rate and the world market price 
exceed their projected values, the surplus arising there from should be shared 
between the government and the farmer as "bonus" or "compensation" to bring 
producer price to the programmed FOB percentage" (Ministry of Finance, 1999:85) 
 
Characterizing interventions and their effects 
This section describes which policy-instruments are implemented to reach sustainable 
agricultural development of cocoa in Ghana. For the sake of clarity, a distinction has been 
made between the four periods as discussed in the previous section. 
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The first and second period: from colonial policies to a more state-controlled economy  
This period is characterized by two shifts, firstly, a gradual shift from a market type of 
governance to (colonial) state governance, and secondly, from colonial control to 
independent state governance. Especially in the years prior to independence there is a 
clear alliance between private and public actors. After independence foreign buyers return 
to their core business and operate more on the side than being active players within 
Ghana. Foreign buyers were interested in control of price fluctuation. In 1937 international 
buyers introduced a ‘cocoa buying agreement’, as a first attempt. Later, the Ghanaian 
government established the Pan-Territorial Fixed Price Policy. On the one hand, this pricing 
system guaranteed farmers a reliable income and assured the government in obtaining 
revenue from cocoa (as the price is determined before the crop is harvested) (Ministry of 
Finance, 1999, 82). But, on the other hand, this guaranteed price was substantial lower 
than the world market price. This low producer-price was the result of high taxes and 
marketing costs. The government compensated farmers by providing them with subsidies 
on inputs and services. Also the government undertook several attempts to channel rural 
credit to farmers. 
 
Product-quality has always been an important attribute of Ghanaian cocoa. Initially, the 
organization of farmers in cooperative societies was regarded as a way to ensure good 
quality performance. When the cooperative movement collapsed, the Ghanaian government 
introduced a quality control system, ensuring the export of good quality cocoa, for which it 
received a premium on the world market. The strong emphasis on quality performance, 
both by public and private actors, has contributed to the still exceptional position of Ghana; 
the only cocoa beans still consistently separated by national origin for grinding purposes 
are those from Ghana (Gibbon and Ponte, 2005, 135-6). 
 
Research and training have always been regarded as important ways of increasing volumes 
of cocoa production and dealing with pests and diseases. In the late 1970s, COCOBOD 
established a special division, bringing knowledge and new technologies to the farmers. 
The third period: Gradual reform 
Liberalization was enforced onto Ghana by international donor organizations, but Ghana 
managed to resist their pressure and chose for the gradual introduction of reforms. In this 
period Ghana’s government remained the dominant coordinator of the supply chain, though 
reforms altered some of its functions. The objective of liberalization of internal marketing 
was to improve the operational and financial performance of Ghana’s marketing system, in 
order to enable higher producer prices and stop Ghana’s declining production trend 
(Ministry of Finance, 1999; Fold, 2002). The aim was to reduce the government tax and 
marketing margins on cocoa gradually. In 1998-99 the producer-price was set at 56 per 
cent of the net f.o.b. price (‘free on board’), the margin reserved for marketing/COCOBOD 
operations was set at 18.2 per cent and Government tax at 25.8 per cent. Within six years 
the producer-price had to increase up to 70 per cent and both its operational costs and 
taxes had to decrease, equaling both 15 per cent of the net FoB (Ministry of Finance, 
1999, 90). In this period, the system of price-stabilization continued to protect farmers 
from price-fluctuations in the world market. In this period also producer-bonuses were 
introduced. 
 
The introduction of gradual reforms has stimulated a recovery of the sector. For Ghana as 
a whole it is estimated that the area harvested from season 1990-91 till 1997-98 
increased with 73 per cent (from 707,000 ha to 1,220,000 ha). But production only 
increased with 37 per cent, indicating a reduction in productivity with 21 per cent; the 
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increase in cocoa production was ‘almost entirely due to the traditional method of 
expanding output by means of additional land’ (Teal and Vigneri, 2004: 8-12). With the 
introduction of reforms, COCOBOD allowed the entering of local buyers of cocoa, providing 
them with licenses to trade cocoa domestically. COCOBOD remained control on the 
external marketing of cocoa. The quality control system of Ghana remained in place, 
contributing to the production of premium quality cocoa in Ghana. 
 
Also the reforms contributed to a gradual increase in producer-price; however, this did not 
automatically resulted in an increase in remunerative farmer income, which also depends 
on the costs of cocoa production, productivity and on diversification of income. Prior to the 
reforms, inputs were generally free or heavily subsidized, but privatization of input 
distribution led to enormous price increases (Haque, 2004; Ministry of Finance, 1999). 
Haque suggests that in Ghana production costs have tripled between 1989 and 1995-
1999. It is argued that the increases in production-costs have led to ‘self-exploitation’ 
among farmers. Farmers worked longer hours themselves, mobilized family members, and 
increased labour exchange groups (Blowfield, 2003). For many farmers currently, 
productivity is low and cocoa production is not economically sustainable (Mehra and Weise, 
2007).  
The fourth period: Shifts from within 
In this recent period the dynamics of the partial liberalized system become clearer. 
Besides public interventions, private actors and NGOs increased their activities in Ghana, 
sometimes in partnership.  
Still COCOBOD continues to intervene in the sector, using partly the same instruments as 
in the period between 1980 and the year 2000. In its interventions the state clearly 
prioritizes the production of good quality cocoa and high quantities of cocoa beans. LBCs 
are still not allowed to become involved in external marketing of cocoa. LBCs receive little 
incentives to invest in their network and to contribute to good quality performance. The 
monopoly on external marketing has also obstructed attempts of NGOs to open up 
alternative marketing channels (e.g. organic cocoa) next to conventional cocoa. 
International buyers, under pressure of media, NGOs and consumer organizations, have 
become involved in the development of national certification schemes, with a focus on 
labour practices and sustainable sourcing.  
 
In terms of increasing producer-prices and reducing margins and taxes, reforms in Ghana 
turned out to be successful. Already for some years farmers receive around 70 per cent of 
the net f.o.b., equalling around 995 USD/ton in 2006-07. Despite this increase in price, 
COCOBOD’s share of the export value remained high. Reinvestments in the sector have 
been various, but there is a lack of clarity on the exact value of these investments and the 
extent to which they benefit farmers equally. The higher producer price did, as intended, 
contribute to a recovery of cocoa production. The recent increase in volume is mainly 
attributed to the product life-cycle of cocoa and state interventions aiming at increased 
productivity, rehabilitation of old cocoa farms and the planting of new varieties (hybrid 
trees). Smuggling also contributed to the increase in volume of cocoa beans. Surprisingly, 
productivity in Ghana did not increase. The expansion of output was accompanied by a 
large increase in num-ber of person-days on the farm, what suggest that the cocoa boom 
therefore seems to have fueled investments in education and in employment opportunities 
in other sectors (Teal, Zeitlin and Maamah, 2006). 
 
Although QCD remained responsible for the final quality checks, in this period some 
problems with quality performance occurred. It is likely that the introduction of competition 
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among local buyers based on volume (instead of prices or quality) reduced the incentive 
for LBCs and their Purchasing Clerks (PCs), buying cocoa at the community level, to be 
very strict about quality control and it induced PCs to cheat farmers with wrongly adjusted 
scales used for weighing cocoa (Laven and Baud, forthcoming). COCOBOD declared in 
2005 all bags of cocoa with more than 25 per cent ‘purple beans’ as sub-standard, and 
paid local buyers only half of the producer-price. This constrained LBCs financial 
performance and seriously affected the livelihood of many farmers; not being able to sell 
(or store) their cocoa they loss their main source of income (Laven, 2007b). Despite these 
(temporary) problems, due to quality losses in neighbouring countries, Ghana continues to 
receive a premium for its cocoa beans.  Farmers in general appreciate the liberalization of 
internal marketing, and claim that ‘it saved them from a lot of hardship’, as their payments 
are now made on time.  
 
To stimulate cocoa production farmers have been receiving ‘free spraying’ on their farms. 
Also public and private pilots have started to provide farmers with fertilizer on credit. The 
cocoa output increase is a combined result of ‘input intensification’ in the Ashanti and 
Brong Ahafo Region, and ‘extensive expansion’ in the Western Region (Teal, Zeitlin and 
Maamah, 2006 The poor quality of public extension services has been reason for the 
private sector and for NGOs to initiate public-private-civil partnerships, supporting farmer-
driven extension programmes. International manufacturers and processors, driven by risks 
of supplier failure, also started to invest increasingly in research (with a focus on pests and 
diseases and the development of new varieties) and became involved in community 
development and international certification schemes.  
 
Surprisingly, the introduction of competition did not result in farmers negotiating with local 
buyers in selling their produce collectively or negotiating for extra services as a group (for 
example through contract farming). They prefer selling to someone from their social 
network, and lack the institutional arrangements to support their negotiating power; a 
major legacy of the former state-marketing system.  
 
Additional to the facilitation of inputs and knowledge to the farmers, COCOBOD developed 
a unique institutional arrangement to support the access of producers to rising cocoa 
prices. COCOBOD reinvests part of its margin back in the cocoa sector, giving farmers 
incentives to remain involved in cocoa production and increase their volume of production. 
This bonus is an outcome of the  yearly recalculation of margins and prices by COCOBOD. 
This bonus is distributed by the COCOBOD through the LBC’s and its Purchasing Clerks. 
Access to this bonus is not without costs as some administrative regulations have to be 
fulfilled, less feasible in more remote areas. Furthermore, the bonus is not for all farmers, 
e.g. it excludes sharecroppers as eligible for the bonus. 
 
Total bonus payments to farmers 2000-2006 
Season Amount in Cedis Amount in US$ 
2000/2001 ¢70.1 billion 6.79 million 
2001/2002 ¢41.5 billion 4.12 million 
2002/2003 ¢157.9 billion 15.30 million 
2003/2004 ¢161.2 billion 15.62 million 
2004/2005 None 17.26 million 
2005/2006 ¢178.2 billion 58.99 million 
Total ¢608.9 billion  6.79 million 
Source: Ministry of Finance, 2007. 
http://www.ghana.gov.gh/ghana/speech_deputy_finance_minister_prof_gyan_baffour.jsp 
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4. Côte d’Ivoire* 
 
 
In sum 
Côte d’Ivoire had a similar start as Ghana, but its state-controlled governance 
system, where credit, pricing and export licensing where intimately linked has 
always had more private partners. Till 1990 the government had major control 
of the cocoa sector. The farmers are dependent for the export and the 
domestic market on governmental controlled institutions. After the 1990s a 
more market-based corporate governance system is in place. After the 
breakdown of its institutions following the failed cocoa hold up and increased 
structural adjustment pressures from World Bank and IMF after the debt crisis, 
the market became again the major mechanism for price negotiation. Foreign 
companies used the room given for investments in the country and increased 
‘in-company’ chain integration. However, due to the civil war, this process is 
heavily influenced by pressures to generate ‘cash for arms’ instead of 
possibilities to invest and upgrade chain activities.  
 
Changing Institutional Governance Systems in Côte d’Ivoire Cocoa 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The economy of Côte d’Ivoire is primarily dependent on its agriculture: traditional export 
crops, particularly cocoa and coffee, other export crops such as palm oil, hevea, 
pineapple, sugar cane, cotton, bananas, etc. and food crops such as plantains, yams, and 
cassava. Cocoa accounted for one-third of all exports in 2004 (OECD, 2006, 232-237). 
Thus, the cocoa-sector in Cote d’Ivoire became an economic power domestically, but also 
internationally. Cote d’Ivoire is one of the leading producers of cocoa beans. They 
effectuated this position by an exceptional growth which reached in the midst 1990s 40-45 
per cent of world supply and almost 50 per cent of internationally traded cocoa (Losch, 
                                                
* Research Geoffrey Hagelaar and Giel Ton, Wageningen UR 
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2002, 206). In the following decade the institutional environment and sector policies that 
facilitated this economic ‘Miracle’, changed profoundly. 
Ivorian cocoa policies going in motion 
Period 1 1930-1980 Institutional stability with growth  
The specialization of Cote d’Ivoire on cocoa started with colonial rule. The French used the 
country to generate a strong cluster of tropical agro-export crops. Unless in other 
countries in West-Africa, a significant proportion of the cocoa export where generated by 
French planters. The African cocoa growers united in 1944 in the trade union of African 
cocoa farmers, lead by Felix Houphouët-Boigny. He became the first African minister in a 
European country, and was the ‘founding father’ of the independence form French colonial 
rule. He was elected first time president of the country in 1960 and stayed in power till 
1993. He supported the influx of migrants form Europe and neighbouring countries to 
boost agricultural production. This period can be characterized by a mixture of public ad 
private efforts with the effect of stimulating, amongst others, the cocoa production and 
export of Cote d’Ivoire. Production, collection, storage, conditioning and shipping was in 
private hands. The Ivorian marketing board, lead by the Ivorian government, had the task 
to license private buying agents and export firms, setting producer prices, rate of 
remuneration, and commission for traders; and giving final approval to sales contracts with 
overseas buyers of cocoa but also in the case of coffee (Hecht, 1983, 34).The boost in 
market demand of cocoa facilitated this strong increase in production. After independence 
(1960), a continuity of existing institutions and deepening relationships with (foreign) firms 
in the cocoa business can be witnessed. 
 
At the export level, the originally French colonial trading societies (CFAO, SCOA, CFCI) were 
progressively replaced by new specialized exporters of foreign origin (SIFCA, JAG, SHAG, 
DAFCI). These gradually sold shares to local interests transferred to private capital (mainly 
the Comafrique society).  The stabilization system created by the French colonial 
authorities allowed private exporters to remain in business under the centralized 
management of the marketing board called the Caisse de stabilization, abbreviated to 
Caisse or Caisstab. This set up continued after independence when the gradually increased 
powers of the Caisstab did not displace private exporters, though it strongly regulated 
their activity through a system of buying quotas. This system of strong vertical 
coordination was arena of strong political pressures. It led to the appearance of fictitious 
exporters, benefiting from political protection to profit in the market or for quotas, which 
sold their quotas to actual exporters, who undertook the physical management of the 
product. At the export level the marketing board gained via taxes 38 per cent of the export 
earnings from cocoa (Hecht, 1983, 30). 
 
At the level of domestic marketing – called traite – coordination between agents (farmers, 
farm-gate buyers, wholesalers (called traitants) and exporters) rested on commercial 
channels based on longstanding ‘gentlemen’s agreements’ and a system of redeemable 
cash loans (mandates) granted by exporters using bank credit. This vertical coordination 
was built up and strengthened by the stabilization system through an administrative 
scheme called the barème (scale). This involved the Caisstab fixing the cocoa prices 
annually for each stage of the marketing chain (farm-gate, collection centre, exporter 
warehouse, port warehouse, f.o.b., c.i.f.). Product quality was dealt with by exporters 
(entailing complementary drying, cleaning and calibration) under final control of the Caisse 
de stabilization. 
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Also on the international level, cocoa was coordinated by centralized public systems in 
producing countries (boards, offices, ‘caisses’, and institutes). These international 
institutions established crop quality standards. These quality standards served to 
determine premiums and discounts on quoted prices at the moment of exports. However, 
the country also used a stabilization system that offered producers a guaranteed price and 
outlet that did not take into account the quality of the product upstream in the chain 
(Losch, 2002, 208). According to the principle of the Caisse de stabilization, private 
exporters were the owners of the cocoa but needed authorization from the Caisse in order 
to export it. At the end of the 1970s, however, the Caisstab had developed so-called 
‘direct’ sales, in which it negotiated contracts itself and demanded that private exporters 
implement them. This practice had become very important by the end of the 1980’s, 
covering up to 80 per cent of the harvest. 
 
Like many other producing countries, Cote d’Ivoire invested in a cocoa bean grinding 
industry from the early 1960s, for two reasons. One was specific to cocoa marketing and 
aimed to improve performance and revenues by adding value to poor quality beans 
through processing, hence improving the quality of the exported raw product. The other 
reason was a more general promotion of industry in the governments program of 
economic development. Three industrial cocoa grinding companies were created and 
benefited from public participation, subsidies and preferential tax regimes. The first was 
(SACO) created by a French industrial enterprise (Cocoa Barry) in 1962. The other two (API 
and PROCACI) were formed as parastatals in 1968 and 1977, with private management 
contracts then transferred respectively to SACO and a new Ivorian company (UNICAO) 
(Losch, 2006, 209). 
 
Production is largely in the hands of smallholders farms. In 1975 for instance there were 
450.000 peasant farmers which were growing cocoa and coffee on an average 5.4 
hectares a household. This small-scale production is export –oriented and based on the 
combination of family and wage labour. The wage labourers are mainly a migrant 
workforce stemming from Guinea, Mali and Burkina Faso (Hecht, 1983, 36-37). The boost 
of the production of cocoa was mainly caused by the increase in the overall expansion of 
area under cultivation caused by the increase in the number of smallholder farms. The 
production of cocoa was not lifted by improving the yield per hectare or intensifying the 
production otherwise (Hecht, 1983, 42). Collection, storage and export firms were 
dominantly foreign.  For instance, in 1980 Lebanese buying agents and transporters 
dominated collection and storage while French firms controlled the international marketing 
and shipping (Hecht, 1983, 34). 
 
Globalization of the cocoa market received its form through an international agreement 
(1972). This agreement united producer and consumer countries and installed a pricing 
system and an institutional buffer stock  After international price booms from 1977 to 
1979, prices fell and the international agreement could do very little about it. Cote d’Ivoire 
pulled out of the international agreement. Cote d’Ivoire tried to revive the in 1962 founded 
Cocoa producers’ Alliance and it attempted some unilateral action, deluded by its position 
as the leading world supplier of cocoa. Actions were to pull out cocoa beans from the 
market, increase its grinding capacity and inaugurated the practice of block dealing 
(Losch, 2002, 211). Prominent in this struggle for improving price levels, has been the 
historic cocoa strike. Between July 1987 and October 1989, the government of Cote 
d’Ivoire blocked all shipments and tried to organize stocks in Europe. However, these 
endeavours were a total failure because the market could wait until Ivorian beans were 
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again released. The entry barriers for competitors in the cocoa sector were 
underestimated by Cote d’Ivoire.  
Period 2 1990-2000  Liberalization in progress 
The domestic consequences were disastrous: the cocoa strike lead to the implosion of the 
guaranteed prices system, non-payment to producers, and a stricken and bankrupt 
economy. Due to the virtual bankruptcy of all institutions that had been involved in paying 
higher-than-world-market-prices, the banking system could not give advance loans to the 
farmers any more. The institutions that embodied the system of vertical coordination 
collapsed, and left many chain actors unprepared for doing business in uncontrolled 
markets.  
 
In line with the political winds after the collapse of the socialist stated in Eastern Europe, 
the international donors were keen to formally impose liberalization on the cocoa sector 
and the wider economy and limit the role of the state in economic activities. From 1990 on 
a privatization program was put in place; the state should withdraw from production 
activities and certain services. The process of liberalization was forced upon Côte d’Ivoire 
by donor organizations. The strategic importance of the cocoa sector and the 
governmental control on the cocoa sector via the Caisse de stabilisation were the reasons 
for the government to resist for ten years the international donor organizations over their 
liberalization plans (Losch, 2002, 213). 
 
In the early stages of liberalization, different attempts can be identified to control buying 
networks. One was the organization of a central purchasing pool (the ACCACI company) by 
seven small exporters which ensured product collection. The collecting company worked 
with traditional intermediaries as well as with cooperative organizations. Another newly 
developed organization was the association of producer groups. This system included 
technical support and equipment and a system of cash loans based on guaranteed 
payment at the official price. A third attempt was the approach of vertical integration by a 
trader. This encompassed integrated chain producing quality cocoa with two parts; direct 
production and product preparation (post-harvest fermenting and drying of beans). The 
latter experiment still lasts, the other two schemes extinguished. The running costs of such 
systems were too high to be able to compete effectively in the price competition instigated 
by liberalization. Growers became more sensitive for the buyers’ price bids than to the 
availability of infrastructure and technical support (Losch, 2002, 221, 222). 
 
The effect of this liberalization and deregulation was that small local exporters were no 
longer able to obtain finance without the guarantees of the stabilization system. This 
liberalization process occurred in a period that there was an increasing concentration in 
the sector globally: the number of grinders and manufacturers reduced to each three-four 
big international corporations. A division of labor between those conglomerates evolves. A 
small group of international grinders try to capture the primary production whilst the 
manufacturers concentrate on marketing the end-product. Priority seems to lie with 
producing cheap cocoa butter. Transaction is embedded in chains and these chains are 
now more or less internal to the major global companies/groups. By 2000, 85 per cent of 
all Ivorian exports were in the hands of foreign firms.  
 
In 1999 the key-player in the old system, the so-called Caisse de Stabilization, was 
dismantled. With that, the guaranteed price of cocoa for producers was not offered 
anymore. The system developed in this stage, and still existing, is subjected to the logic of 
the farm gate-buyer. This buyer tries to maximize purchases and proposes prices based 
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on the directions given by partner exporters. Firms compete by securing the loyalty of their 
middlemen rather than of producers, as well as on liquidity (no guarantees from cocoa 
institutions) and their capacity to adjust rapidly to price movements (Losch, 2002, 222). 
 
Liberalization is imposed by international donors. The next quote is taken from the 
Memorandum of understanding (IMF, 2002) between the IMF and the government of Cote 
d’Ivoire: 
 
‘In the coffee/cocoa sector, the government will consolidate the liberalization of the 
sector and continue building an institutional framework that (i) eliminates any direct 
government intervention and any direct or indirect financial support in the 
marketing of major commodities; (ii) ensures that international price changes are 
adequately passed on to producers; and (iii) guarantees free and fair competition at 
all levels, while preventing monopolistic practices or a return to a system of export 
quotas.’  
 
The shift away from domestic price stabilization, to the policy to reflect international price 
changes directly to producers, has led to a situation where prices of cocoa are volatile 
throughout the cropping season and also differ between regions in the cocoa zone (Losch, 
2002, 223). The guaranty price still exists, but is only indicative now, not enforceable. 
Instead a new institutional context for the cocoa chain was introduced. Instead of the 
Caisse, new managing bodies in the sector were built, such as; 
• the coffee and cocoa regulation authority, Autorité de regulation du café et du 
cacao [ARCC]; for regulatory issues 
• the coffee and cocoa exchange, Bourse du café et du cacao [BCC], for price 
discovery and price risk management 
• the regulatory fund, Fonds de régulation et de contrôle [FRC]; for export credits 
• the coffee and cocoa producers’ development fund, Fonds de dévelopment des 
activités des producteurs de café et cacao [FDPCC], for financing producer-
sponsored rural development initiatives (Worldbank, 2003). 
Period 3 2000-present Political instability 
These new institutions emerged in a period of increased political instability, including a 
military coup in 1999, followed by an army rebellion in September 2002, and 
postponement of several presidential elections in 2005, 2006 and 2007. The on-going 
conflict between the northern and southern part of Côte d’Ivoire crippled the role of the 
state. However, despite the geographical separation and political instability, Cote d’Ivoire 
still accounts for 40 per cent of the world’s production of cocoa in 2006.  
 
Cocoa is the main economic resource of the country, representing on average 35 per cent 
of the total value of the Ivorian exports, worth around 750 bn CFA. An estimated 10 per 
cent of the country’s cocoa is grown in the rebel-controlled zone in the north, the rest of 
the cocoa is grown in the government-controlled south. In both zones, specific system of 
levies and taxes are implemented. The national government and especially Laurent 
Gbagbo, the country’s president who came to power in 2001, succeeded to retain control 
of the national cocoa and financial institutions. The Ivorian government reinstated some 
sort of minimum producer price and tries to regulate competition to limit market 
concentration. This initiative was taken as a result of the pressure of and leaders of local 
companies.  
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Civil society organisations, and in particular Global Witness, report on the relationship 
between financial flows in cocoa and the on-going conflict in the country. Global Witness 
refers to a speech by the president thanking cocoa farmers for their gifts; there has been 
a discussion among the different cocoa bodies about the appropriateness of using the 
money for the purchase of weaponry. The cocoa bodies agreed a consensus on this point 
and mentioned the importance of protecting of farmers’ lives and possessions (Global 
Witness, 2007: 24, 25). Global Witness estimates that a comparable amount (about 
15.1bn CFA -US$30m- per year) of money is generated in the rebel-hold northern part of 
the country to fuel the rebel army (Global Witness, 2007: 37-41). A cocoa blockade 
prevented northern cocoa transiting to the south, which secured revenues from the cocoa 
trade for the ones controlling the northern region. Much of the cocoa of the northern zone 
is exported via Ghana, Burkina Faso and Togo. Companies buying cocoa in Togo are in 
fact buying Ivorian cocoa.  
 
Characterizing interventions and their effects 
The first period: Institutional stability 
The interventions in the cocoa sector in this period exemplify the conditions of state 
governance. Although there is private ownership (grinding companies, exporters, farmers) 
and there is cooperation between the public and private sector at a first glance, 
centralization of the state becomes evident when studying the implementation and effect of 
policy instruments. The Ivorian government influenced directly all actors involved. The 
tasks and responsibilities of the Caisse give this organization a powerful position: the 
Caisse is in control of the chain. 
 
The guaranteed prices meant for the small farmers a guaranteed income. The guaranteed 
price was about ¼ of the world market price. Although not always, but the trend was of a 
gradually increasing price through the years. Besides a guaranteed price, farmers could 
receive a bonus when adopting certain production techniques (new variety, spacing, 
spraying). The area of cultivated land expanded because of new, mainly immigrant farmers 
who had access to credit to start cultivation. This had as an effect that average farm size 
stayed small (5-20 hectares) and the number of farmers exploded to up to 800.000 
farmers. By imposing export quotas the state influenced the amount of tonnes of cocoa 
and influenced with such measures the market. The taxes on export rose to 38-40 percent. 
A part was re-invested in the cocoa sector for instance to set up grinding companies. The 
greater part fell to a small elite mainly within the government and industry in Côte d’Ivoire 
(Hecht, 1983, 31-42) 
 
By controlling the amounts to export and which company is able to export, the Ivorian 
government influenced the growth and size of the export companies. The state arranged 
that the exporting companies were and stayed small. There were 50-60 exporting 
companies which were eventually in private hands, but because of the already mentioned 
state interventions the exporting companies were very dependent on the government. This 
meant certainty for farmers, and combined with the Ivorian land policy, this stimulated the 
growth of the cocoa production. The price which the producer received however was not 
enough to invest in the expansion of the farming activities. Therefore, the farmers stayed 
small. As the collection of the cocoa beans was done by intermediaries, there did not 
develop farmer cooperatives to produce and market the cocoa by themselves. As long as 
the production and marketing functions are executed by governmental controlled 
institutions and exporters and within a system of guarantees, farmers have a certain level 
of livelihood. The farmers were satisfied but did not receive the resources to develop and 
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expand their farm. However, when the power balance within the cocoa chain changes from 
the Ivorian government to multinational grinders and roasters, the volatility of the market 
starts to influence the cocoa prices and in line with that the livelihood of the producers. 
The farmers are then a vulnerable part of the cocoa chain. The group of farmers was not 
prepared for a change of power within the cocoa chain. 
The second period: Liberalization in progress  
Liberalization is enforced on to Cote d’Ivoire by donor organizations like the IMF. This 
means as described above, that market forces become the overall governance 
mechanism. Decisions on the supply and processing of cocoa beans become ‘chain 
internal’ decisions which are made along the supply chain. Taking control of the supply 
chain has become the task of the few big grinders which are left in the world. The Ivorian 
government tries to fight this ‘take-over’, but is compelled by donor organizations to 
liberalize the cocoa market. One way of trying to keep control on the export revenues of 
coffee, after the breakdown of the Caisse de Stabilisation, is the installation of several new 
institutions based on World Bank suggestions. To fund these institutions the government 
raised taxes. The Droit Unique de Sortie (DUS) export tax levied by the state of Côte 
d’Ivoire provides the latter with a significant source of revenue. Taxes on cocoa, the 
bulwark of the Ivorian economy, are currently nearly 40 per cent of the export price. 
Through the DUS, 20 per cent of these go to the state, and 20 per cent to the various 
managing bodies of the sector (PRSP, 2002). World Bank is pressing for lowering these 
taxes and para-taxes, to improve the price share for producers, but the IMF is ambivalent, 
as the cocoa revenues are crucial for Ivorian debt service. 
 
The important changes in Ivorian trade policy began in 1994. By making imports more 
costly, the change in the parity of the CFA franc allowed a series of measures to liberalize 
imports and domestic and foreign trade to be implemented. The State's control over 
production, domestic marketing and export prices often makes it fully responsible for any 
price risk, whether for agricultural or energy products. The effect of such a system has 
been that price fluctuations on global markets, especially for coffee and cocoa, have had a 
much greater impact on the State's finances than on the private sector (WTO, 1995).  
 
As administered prices disappeared form 1999 onwards, prices for cocoa become volatile 
and more vulnerable for changes in market prices during this period. The implementation 
of these instruments directed at liberalization of the market coincided with a trend of 
concentration of the downstream parties of the cocoa chain. The grinding parties and the 
chocolate producing companies concentrated both into 3-5 conglomerate multi-nationals. 
By opening up the cocoa market by abolishing quotas and guaranteed prices and the trend 
in concentration of downstream companies, it becomes apparent that companies are 
setting the prices for cocoa for farmers as well. 
 
Quality has shown a downward trend over the years 1997-2000 (Losch, 2002, 222). The 
liberalization reforms introduced in the cocoa sector (as well as in the coffee sector) in 
October 2002 had three goals: to end direct government intervention and all direct or 
indirect financial support of the cocoa trade; to obtain adequacy between world prices and 
producer prices and; to secure the efficiency of competition. The current organization of 
the cocoa sector, however, lacks clarity, due notably to the overlapping of the various 
competent institutions. In addition, producer co-operatives suffer from both lack of 
resources and the inability to obtain a larger share of the market, the minimum price 
having become a mere guiding price (AfDB/OECD 2006, 232-233).  
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The institutional system remains geared to collecting taxes which has a strong influence on 
the difference between the world prices and the price that farmers get for their product. 
The dismantling of the administered marketing system increased uncertainty and risk. The 
livelihood of farmers has become vulnerable and they are dependent on the intermediaries 
who buy their cocoa at the farm gate. Also for national and foreign processing firms 
uncertainty increased about volumes qualities delivered, and how the farmers and initial 
buying agents would be financed following stricter conditions of bank credit. In 2000, new 
institutions related to the Coffee and Cocoa Regulation Authority (Autorité de Régulation du 
Café et du Cacao – ARCC) were, with World Bank support, organised to provide some form 
of price predictability and stability in the market. These used two major mechanisms: 
- The Regulation Fund (Fonds de Régulation et de Contrôle du Café et Cacao – FRC) 
- The Coffee and Cocoa Auction (Bourse du Café et Cacao- (BCC) 
The BCC registers prices of all cocoa procurement and shipping in Côte d’Ivoire, and 
makes these prices publicly available. Based on a cost structure of the activities in the 
chain it calculates an indicative producer price. If the ARCC decides that this price is too 
low, it can instruct the FRC to intervene in cocoa markets procuring at a higher price. 
However, in practice this active role of the FRC to stabilize prices in the market has been 
absent in the first years of its existence. 
The third period: Political instability 
In this period of political turbulence and civil warfare, the Ivorian government implement 
these new institutions. The intention is clearly oriented at damping the turbulence for the 
farmers, and also by imposing taxes, to generate the necessary funds for non-cocoa 
related expenses, including the resolution of the civil war. The tax pressure on cocoa is 
high, partly due to the collapse of some sectors of the economy and the closure of many 
small and medium-sized companies that have made the government to depend primarily on 
the tax levies on cocoa (OECD, 2007). Global Witness (2007) also observed that parastatal 
agencies responsible for economic conditions in the cocoa sector used large amounts 
from levies on cocoa transactions for non-cocoa related purposes. During this episode, 
characterised by a complex intertwining of private and government (or rebel-government) 
governance of the sector, financial transparency of the institutions controlling the cocoa 
sector was reduced. This eroded the effort to stabilise prices in the cocoa value chain. 
However, farmer pressure for an effective minimum producer price is strong and, with the 
civil war waning, the government policy is expected to be increasingly geared to make the 
’indicative’ producer price defined by ARCC as the effective minimum price to farmers by a 
more targeted use of the FRC funds. Some pilot experiments with risk management 
instruments like ‘hedging’ are started with support of the CFC and ICCO. 
 24
5. Ecuador* 
 
 
In sum 
Ecuador started cocoa production with an institutional governance system 
where private interest where intimately related between producers 
(plantations), exporters, bankers and policy makers. The existing vertical 
integration has been broken after the 1925 coup d’état and the subsequent 
period of market deepening and globalization of production and consumption. 
Vertical integration has been replaced by a more facilitating role of the 
government, and an atomization of production due to changes in land tenure, 
replacing the plantation model with the smallholder model of production as 
dominant feature of cocoa production in Ecuador. The current emphasis of the 
Ecuadorian government in developing public-private chain platforms makes 
that this ‘relatively’ market-based governance system is heading to a corporate 
or even (incipient) joint governance system.  
 
Changing Institutional Governance Systems in Ecuadorian Cocoa 
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Introduction 
Ecuador is a major player in the world cocoa economy. Not because of its volume of 
cocoa, but because of the quality of the beans. The market share of fine and flavour cocoa 
(FF cocoa) has fallen dramatically over the last century, due to new processing technology, 
bulk cocoa beans proof to be good or even preferred by some chocolate manufacturers. 
However, especially in Europe the demand for this type of specialty cocoa is growing and 
easily capable to absorb production increases. International demand of FF cocoa 
outweighs supplies, which creates a very attractive niche for cocoa chain development. 
The quality of Ecuadorian cocoa has been a product of nature, without much additional 
quality policies, until the end of the twentieth century, when quality policies have been 
introduced to shape its distinctiveness with other varieties on the Ecuadorian market. 
                                                
* Research Giel Ton, Wageningen UR 
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Ecuadorian cocoa sector policies in motion 
Period 1 1900–1925 Cocoa Boom and Private Banking 
Ecuador has been the major producer country of cocoa during the late 19th and beginnings 
of the 20th century. By the turn of the century, it provided 20-25 per cent of world 
production. High cocoa prices, coupled with abundant supplies of cheap labour and an 
infrastructure of rivers that connected the production areas with global export markets, 
gave rise to booming business. A powerful oligarchy, made up of large producers, 
exporter, importers and bankers, developed in the coastal areas of Guayaquil. Backward 
and forward linkages of the cocoa sector with the rest of the Ecuadorian economy were 
limited (De Janvry, 1981; Henderson, 1997). The rivers formed a cheap and efficient form 
of transport for cocoa shipping and this generated few incentives to use cocoa revenues 
for road or rail construction. Though cocoa exports provided the main source of currency 
for imports and fiscal income for the state, little of this hard currency was spent on 
productive infrastructure or invested in domestic manufacturing. The Ecuadorian cocoa 
boom created a class of very rich families, many of them living abroad, that concentrated 
state power and enjoyed a life-style based on imported luxuries (Larrea and North, 1997). 
 
The direct intertwining between these private family interests and the government during 
this period manifested itself in the development of the so-called ‘baquete de estado’ (the 
state’s  banquet) around the agricultural bank – BCA (Banco Comercial y Agrícola) – based 
in Guayaquíl. Henderson (1997) gives a careful and precise description of this:  
 
‘In order to sustain politically necessary expenditure (..), liberal governments, 
dependent on fluctuating income from customs revenues and largely denied access to 
foreign loans, a consequence of Ecuador’s poor history of debt servicing, increasingly 
resorted to borrowing from domestic banks. The steadily mounting internal public debt 
was for the most part funded by two Guayaquil banks, the Banco de1 Ecuador and the 
Banco Comercial y Agricola. At the turn of the century roughly half of the debt was 
owed to these two institutions and the proportion continued to rise in subsequent 
years, with the BCA assuming the dominant role in 1911. (..)Another organization that 
became key in fostering the dominance of BCA was through the Association of 
Agriculturists -, the Asociación de Agricultores, which was established in 1912 by 
prominent cocoa exporters to control the price of Ecuadorian cocoa on the world 
market. In 1914 the Asociación began buying cocoa from producers by paying them 
half in cash and half in vales (i.0.u.s). Speculating on a price rise, it then exported the 
cocoa on consignment. By 1916 the Asociación was responsible for purchasing 77 per 
cent of Ecuador’s cocoa. (..) In purchasing an ever increasing proportion of the 
country’s cocoa, the Asociación was forced to borrow in order to finance its 
operations, the costs of which far exceeded the revenue obtained from the export tax. 
(..) As a guarantee for the loans the export tax was pledged to the Bank. Furthermore, 
as the Asociación’s financial situation deteriorated, the foreign drafts that it received 
for its cocoa were also handed over to the BCA, which thereby came to control a 
substantial share of the country’s foreign trade’ (Henderson, 1997: 179).  
 
By this, the BCA, a private bank, controlled virtually all aspects related with cocoa exports. 
It almost broke down in 1921 due to low post-First World War commodity prices and 
serious cocoa plant diseases (Witches’ Broom and Monilia Pod Rot). Faced with the 
prospect of a major banking collapse and no doubt pressed by the BCA Congressional 
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bloc, the government was forced to intervene, and rescued the bank by admitting ‘free’ 
monetary emissions by the BCA, based on the banks property of state bonds. The result 
proved a ‘solution’ for the financial problems of a private bank and its cocoa plantation 
owners, by shifting the burden to other sectors, creating an inflationary process that 
affected the entire economy. In 1925, a coup d’état, attacked this intimate ‘steering’ of 
state policies in the interest of a class of very rich private families. One of their first actions 
when assuming power was to restructure the omnipotence of the BCA. 
Period 2 1925-1998 From Rent Seeking to Export Promotion 
The 1925 coup d’état indeed managed to break the financial-political oligarchy. They 
dismantled the BCA and re-engineered the monetary institutions to  prevent a similar 
banking crisis as with BCA (Drake, 1989). However, the Great Depression and World War II 
made it difficult to attract investments in a more national, broad based, development. The 
dependence of the Ecuadorian state on agro-export taxes made it dependant of the 
political power of the plantations. Next to the cocoa and coffee exports, the banana 
plantations began to spur. As these plantations are mostly located in the lowlands, it re-
affirmed the dependency of the state (in the capital Quito) of the second main city 
Guayaquil. This relation induced CEPAL (UN Economic Commission for Latin America and 
the Caribbean) to call the development of Ecuador ‘bi-centralista’, with two centres. The 
flow of economic rents form the periphery to these centres left the rest of the country 
disarticulated from the benefits of economic circulation and growth, resulting in extreme 
poverty. The post-war booming banana sector reproduced the situation that few incentives 
were there to start a process of ‘import substituting industrialisation’, the economic policy 
recommended by CEPAL during the 50-70s, During the 1960s and 1970 petrol became 
Ecuador’s most important export product replacing the agro-export sector as the major 
source of fiscal income. 
 
The upward spiral in oil prices during the 1970s and the boost to public sector revenues 
derived from oil exports freed the Ecuadorian government from persistent balance of 
payments deficits and from reliance on domestic taxation to fund expenditure, enabling the 
state to embark upon an ambitious programme of industrial development, infrastructure 
expenditure and social investment). (..)The new oil wealth gave a further stimulus to a 
process of industrial development already aided by preferential treatment and favoured 
status under the provisions of the Andean Pact. The manufacturing sector was able to 
appropriate for itself a substantial share of the new oil wealth in the form of subsidies and 
protection for new industries, tax concessions and the formation of joint ventures involving 
the state, national and multinational capital. As a result manufacturing industry grew at an 
annual average rate of 10 per cent between 1972 and 1981, so that by the end of the 
decade manufactured goods comprised 25 per cent of total exports (Corkill 1985). Also 
the state bureaucracy increased sharply. Quito developed in a large part as a result of 
increasing public servants employment. Ecuador registered one of the highest average 
annual growth rates in public sector employment in the developing world (in excess of 10 
per cent for 1976-80), with the capital city benefiting disproportionately (Corkill, 1985). 
 
This petrol ‘bonanza’ created the conditions for structural deficits in public finance. 
Revenues from petrol exploitation made Ecuador a preferred client of international lenders. 
At the turn of the century this had resulted in one of the most indebted countries in Latin 
America. The scarcity of hard currency and the balancing of the fiscal deficit were coped 
with by monetary politics of money creation and associated devaluation the local currency. 
This depreciation of the local currency, made domestic costs relatively cheap and resulted 
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in high revenues from exports. This obviously favoured the cocoa sector, and partially 
offset negative impacts of the falling cocoa prices during the 1980-90s.  
Period 3  1998-2007 The ‘Dollarized Economy’ and Competitiveness 
The Ecuadorian cocoa economy collapsed in the 1995-1998 period due major political and 
economic turbulence. The chart above illustrated the productive an economic decline 
during the 1990s. As world cocoa production has increased greatly, and also the specialty 
cocoa markets found a major producer in Indonesia, the volume of Ecuadorian cocoa has 
stagnated on to the pre 1995 level. In contrast, export earnings have risen sharply due to 
rising commodity prices (Figure 4). Productivity of Ecuadorian trees is relatively low, 
though marketing costs are reported to be lower than in competing countries (Collinson 
and Leon, 2000). 
 
Political turmoil resulted in several short-lived presidencies: the populist president 
Buckaram, elected in 1997, was declared ‘mentally ill’ by the political opposition, reacting 
especially on allegations of corruption and economic mismanagement during his short rule, 
and replaced in a sequence of presidents with little control over the country and alleges by 
charges of corruption and economic mismanagement. The situation of hyperinflation 
resulted in a sequence of popular uprising that culminated in January 21 2000 when 
President Mahuad fled the country after the popular movement took the National 
Assemblee by force. Vice-president Noboa took office and implemented a shock therapy in 
which Ecuador tuned to a dollarized economy: the US dollar became the official national 
currency. This dollarization dramatically changed the possibilities for the Ecuadorian 
government to use the devaluation of the currency as means to offset production 
inefficiencies and falling prices. The “dollarization” of the economy forced companies to be 
more efficient in order to compete in the international market.  
 
Figure  4 Ecuador cocoa beans export (1990-2006) 
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
120,000
140,000
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Total tm
Miles US$ FOB
 
Source: http://www.sica.gov.ec) 
 
The emphasis of the Ecuador government agricultural policy is therefore on an increased 
facilitation of chain partnerships and chain development efforts. The importance of 
coordinated chain action is especially important in the Ecuador cocoa sector that depends 
to a significant degree on its quality of produce (FF cocoa). Creating an enabling 
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environment for the marketing of the Ecuador specialty cocoa has become a top priority in 
Ecuador cocoa sector policy. 
 
This enabling policy for chain development became manifest in the regulation of quality in 
the cocoa chain that led to a specific policy to steer the impacts of the introduction and 
marketing of a new cocoa variety: CCN51.  National cocoa trees (‘Arriba’) are low yielding 
and are mostly restricted to small and medium sized farms. CCN51 by contrast is a 
relatively new, high yielding variety and is mostly produced on large-scale plantations. 
Ecuador’s local cocoa processing and chocolate manufacturing industries prefer CCN51 
because it has high cocoa butter fat content and suffers no mould problems, but most 
cocoa exporters are in favour of national cocoa and its associated quality premiums. 
Exporters’ profitability relies heavily on this price differential (around 15 per cent). Under 
the responsibility of the Ecuadorian National Council for Reactivation of Production and 
Competitiveness  - CNRPC (Consejo Nacional para la Reactivación de la Producción y la 
Competitividad) the sector concentrated on a limited number of value chains. A key one is 
the value chain of specialty cocoa. CNRPC supports the Consultative Council of the 
Agroindustrial Chain of Cocoa and Derivates (Consejo Consultivo de la Cadena 
Agroindustrial Cacao y Elaborados). Supported by funding of the European Union and GTZ, 
this council aims to recover/defend the special position of Ecuador cocoa on the world 
market. Major result of this chain coordination is the decree of July 2005 that defines that 
specialty coffee (‘Arriba’) has to be marketed separately form the new CCN51 variety.  
 
Another milestone in cocoa chain development has been the 2004 National Forum of the 
Cocoa Chain, which gave rise to a shared vision and action plan. Follow-up is given by two 
entities: the Steering Committee composed of chain actors (active in production); and a 
Support Group, composed of supporting stakeholders (NGOs and donors). Their activities 
continue with BID donor support. The shared vision is to double cocoa production within 5 
years. The cocoa sector strategy focus is on 4 objectives 
(http://www.ecuadorcocoaarriba.com/):  
• renovate and improve existing plantations to increase yields;  
• align product quality to market demands;  
• further positioning of the Ecuador’s  fine and aromatic cocoa ("cacao fino y de 
aroma de Ecuador") in the national and international markets 
• the nation wide organisation and entrepreneurial skills of the small scale cocoa 
producers is strengthened and they are more efficiently linked in the chain 
 
 
Characterizing interventions and their effects 
The first period: Cocoa Boom and Private Banking 
The first period in Ecuadorian cocoa sector policies can be characterized as a combination 
rather strong vertical coordination of the cocoa chain through the Guayaquil oligarchy. 
They manifested itself in two organizations: the BCA (the private Commercial and 
Agricultural Bank) and the Association of Agriculturalists that in the early twentieth century 
managed to control most of the cocoa production, trade and exports. There was very 
intense personal intertwining between cocoa associated private interests and the 
Ecuadorian state. The strong chain coordination could translate itself in very favourable, 
though in the end unsustainable, public policies that generated culminated in 1921 with a 
bankruptcy and a monetary emission when the tree pests devastated the Ecuador cocoa 
production from 40.000 TM in 1915 to 15.000 TM in 1930 (Cabrera, 2005). During this 
period the fiscal needs of the state have been negotiated intimately with the private 
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interest of the oligarchy. The governance structure of the cocoa chain in this period can be 
placed in the utmost corner of the Joint Governance quadrant of the matrix. 
The second period: From Rent Seeking to Export Promotion 
During the second period the vertical integration in the cocoa chain was significantly 
reduced. Smallholders entered and replaced the plantations as prime production sector. 
The state tried to break with the oligarchy and increasingly depended on support of other 
sectors in the economy.  Meanwhile, the oligarchy diversified its activities to other sectors 
in the economy, especially in bananas. In the 1970s petrol became the key sector for the 
generation of fiscal revenues. We may place the governance structure that characterizes 
this period between state governance and market governance. Compared with the 
previous period the coordination in the value chain became less hierarchic and more 
market based, and state involvement was important though not decisive in shaping sector 
policies. 
 
As monetary and trade policies, were characterized by protection of the emerging 
manufacture sector and ‘cheap food for the cities’, the price level of domestic costs 
structurally lagged behind the value of ‘hard currency’ generated by exports. The cocoa 
sector policy became integrated with wider macro-economic policies of export promotion 
and import substitution that generated conditions for the development of local processing 
facilities. In line with the dominant paradigms about an import substituting industrial policy 
(ECLA-CEPAL) and the generating a fair and better predictable world price (UNCTAD), 
Ecuador participated in the international cocoa agreement that tried to influence world 
market prices. 
The third period: The ‘Dollarized Economy’ and Competitiveness  
The value of the domestic currency becomes replaced by the value of the US dollar. 
Current macro-economic policy room is limited to the managing of fiscal and trade 
balances, but it is impossible for the Ecuadorian government to use the instrument of 
money creation as it has prevailed in the past. Likewise, the influence of state policies in 
the cocoa chain has been strongly reduced as a result of the dollarization of the economy. 
The role of the state is explicitly limited and focussed on the creation of ‘strategic alliances’ 
between chain actors. The state plays a pivotal role in generating the national 
organisations and consultative councils through which this corporate governance is 
effectively institutionalized. The government plays an active role in fostering chain 
coordination between all involved chain actors. A key activity of the Consejo Consultivo de 
la Cadena Agroindustrial Cacao y Elaborados, is to recover/defend the special position of 
Ecuador cocoa on the world market. Major result of this chain coordination is the decree of 
July 2005 that defines that specialty coffee (‘Arriba’) has to be marketed separately form 
the new CCN51. 
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6. Conclusions 
 
This paper shows that the specific economic conditions for sustainability in producing 
countries are an outcome of the interplay between market coordination and state 
governance. Chain actors, e.g. farmers, processors, traders, are constrained and/or 
enabled by the national economic policies, the rules in the market place and political 
economic power relations in creating competitiveness in global markets. Crucial aspects 
influencing the performance of the cocoa value chain, like production volumes, product 
quality and distribution of value between chain actors, are to a large extent a result of the 
changing institutional governance systems and its ‘enabling environment’. Accordingly, the 
paper suggests that policy and strategy targeting sustainability in a complex and layered 
commodity chain may be more effective when they build on existing governance structures 
and policy measures instead of replacing them with an entire new organisational 
architecture, with a drastically changed division of labour between public and private 
domains. Subsequently, the recommendation is that before replicating or transposing 
organisational frameworks and public sector roles from one context to another, it is 
important to identify the main ‘rationale’ and driving forces behind the historically evolved 
and currently prevailing market regulatory functions and patterns of public sector 
involvement (Joosten and Eaton, 2006). As a result of  such an approach, it is better 
possible to outline the main functions for public policy in achieving sustainability (Vellema et 
al, 2007).  
 
In this paper the prime focus is on mechanism and arrangements that create (or have 
created) the capacity to increase predictability of prices and stability in transactions in the 
cocoa chain, which may lead to inclusive and sustainable development for the large 
numbers of smallholder producers engaged in cocoa. The case studies point at existing 
institutional arrangements generated in the historical development process of a specific 
sector that serve these purposes. This observation draws attention to the existence of, 
and suggests a revaluation of, sector specific policies (‘industrial policies’). From the study 
it is obvious that cocoa has sector and country specific problems, e.g. low quality or low 
economies of scale, which have been addressed by specific rather than generic policies. 
Industrial or sector policies have shown to be dynamic and are responding to new 
challenges from their specific historical preconditions, market dynamics and development 
paths. Not all policies are responding in a satisfactory way to all challenges. Instead of 
exploring a ‘best for all’ policy recommendation, the challenge lies in finding appropriate 
and effective institutional arrangements that respond to context specific sector policies 
and that are based on transparent public-private configurations. This may imply the need 
for change in focus by policy makers and  a shift in interest from macro policies to policies 
filling the void at meso level when targeting sector or commodity specific measures for 
sustainability.  
 
In all three countries we see that at a certain point of time a transition has been made from 
an institutional governance system with strong state involvement in price setting and 
international trade to a system where transactions are more market based. The extent to 
which the state keeps a leading role differs. In Côte d’Ivoire, the public private interaction 
governing the cocoa sector changed dramatically. While Ghana maintained a stronger state 
involvement in defining prices and contract conditions. In Ecuador we see that the role of 
the state in cocoa taxation is far less than in the West African countries. In both Ghana and 
Côte d’Ivoire, the cocoa sector is still the major agricultural export crop and therefore 
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crucial in generating funds for the state bureaucracy and for national economic 
development. Taxation of the cocoa sector through state control on transactions is higher 
than for other agricultural sectors. Specific (para)fiscal taxation arrangements are created 
to transfer resources to the state. This is reflected in the relative lower producer price: the 
farm-gate price as a percentage of the reference world commodity price for cocoa. This 
producer price as a percentage of the FOB price, is lower in Côte d’Ivoire than in Ghana, 
and both are lower than in Ecuador.  
 
However, perhaps more than with relative producer price levels, the success of cocoa 
sector policies seem to be related to service provision and policy measures in the cocoa 
chain that increase the ‘stability’ in the prices in both input and output markets. Before the 
eighties, state credit was elementary to facilitating access to inputs and the state-led 
pricing system facilitated the predictability and stability of output markets. In all countries 
processes of liberalization and privatization, induced by IMF and World Bank 
conditionalities, affected the possibilities for such an enabling environment. Generally the 
cocoa liberalisation reforms increasingly confronted producers and traders with risks within 
value chain transactions. This increased ‘instability’ in the cocoa value chain has been 
mediated in three case studies with the unfolding of new or adjusted institutional 
arrangements between private chain partners and the state. As a response, private actors 
and NGOs have become increasingly involved in providing some of these services to 
producers. 
 
In Ghana, the state has still a major role to play in the cocoa sector. The Ghanaian state 
continued with the state-control on internal prices, which materialized in the yearly review 
of cocoa prices, margins and bonus system. Their interventions, and their outcomes, have 
eased the responsibilities of other actors to become involved in the sector. For example, 
NGOs play only a marginal role in the cocoa sector. NGOs have also been constrained in 
attempt to introduce organic cocoa in Ghana, providing farmers with a new marketing 
channel for niche markets. It seems that interventions in the cocoa sector in Ghana require 
consent and involvement of the state. Policies aiming at Ghana as a sustainable sourcing 
country are likely to be more successful than the introduction of separate marketing 
channels for sustainable cocoa. 
 
In 2000, the government of Côte d’Ivoire ended state control through the system of 
administered prices, but retained some influence through several new institutional 
arrangements to enhance price predictability and stability in the market. The arrangements 
aim to increase transparency of prices and cost structures and calculate ‘reasonable’ 
producer prices. The government is entitled to intervene in the cocoa market if prices 
decrease too much. In recent years the government took some policy measures to 
respond to price turbulence in the market. However, the cocoa sector was also central in 
the generation of public funds through taxation. The latter outweighed the importance of 
the policy to increase farm-gate prices. More than the new cocoa sector policies, the 
maturing of the new cocoa plantations established during the 1990s turned Côte d’Ivoire 
into the main producing country replacing Ghana as the world leader in cocoa exports. 
Côte d’Ivoire has the international cocoa grinders as the major export companies in the 
country. This concentration of 40% of world cocoa production in Côte d’Ivoire is 
compensating partly for the worsening of the political and business environment and 
facilitated investments of international cocoa grinders in the country. Service provisioning 
by the state is weak; the poor extension services led to the entering of some NGOs and 
public-private partnerships, but on the whole they provide limited alternative services to 
farmers. 
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In Ecuador the international buyers dominate the cocoa value chain. Some domestic cocoa 
processing takes place, but most of the special quality cocoa that Ecuador produces is 
processed in Europe by a wide array of specialized chocolate factories. The government 
mainly sees its role in facilitating chain alliances, which can enforce the special position of 
Ecuador’s quality cocoa in the world market. Quality regulations and public private 
partnerships play an important role in vitalizing this ‘high price niche market’ strategy. The 
Ecuadorian government mainly contributes to institutionalising chain governance and 
coordination. The government’s main influence on the enabling environment for price 
setting within the chain is through quality enhancing policies, especially through the 
separation of modern high yielding lower quality CCN51 cocoa from the traditional low 
yielding higher quality Arriba cocoa. As smallholder grow predominantly Arriba cocoa that 
has a significant price premium on the international market, this policy of chain 
segmentation fosters the economic sustainability of smallholder cocoa production. 
 
 Ghana Côte d’Ivoire Ecuador 
Typification of the 
institutional 
governance system 
Joint Governance Corporate Governance Corporate Governance 
Direction of change of  
public-private 
configuration  
Increasing state 
control on transactions 
and private sector 
investments in chain 
integration 
Corporate Governance 
by the private sector, 
with decreasing state 
involvement linked to 
the civil war 
Corporate  Governance 
on a pathway to Joint 
Governance with a 
facilitating role of the 
state 
Key policy measures 
affecting predictability 
of prices and stability 
in transactions in the 
cocoa chain  
Administered prices 
and fixed margins 
Producer Price Bonus 
Cocoa and Coffee 
Auction 
Regulatory and Control 
Fund - FRC 
Consultative Group on 
Cocoa and Derivates 
Outlook => direction 
of change 
International buyers are 
increasingly 
concentrating 
investments in Ghana, 
as the cocoa sector 
policies create a stable 
environment for 
sourcing bulk cocoa. 
The system gives 
ample incentives for 
improving cocoa yields 
and producer prices. 
Incentives for chain 
segmentation and 
niche marketing based 
on quality 
differentiation is low. 
The state fails to 
create incentives for 
further investments in 
cocoa quantity and 
quality by farmers. 
Service provisioning to 
farmers has been 
severely affected by 
the drain of resources 
due to the civil war. 
Economic sustainability 
of smallholder 
production  will be 
contingent on the use 
of the new cocoa 
institutions for 
increasing the relative 
producer price.  
The state plays a 
facilitating role, only 
marginally draining 
resources away from 
the sector. 
Improvements in 
quality and quantity will 
be centred on 
‘brokerage’ of private – 
private partnerships in 
the cocoa chain. The 
state is in the process 
of re-inventing sector 
specific  policies for 
increasing economic 
sustainability. 
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